No Jobs: The Result of Wizard of Oz Economics


If there is one thing we should have learned from recent data is that you can "juice" the economy by inserting more money into it because when the money works its way through the economy, certain economic data will become more positive.

This is not a difficult concept to grasp. For example, if in a hypothetical economy there is a $1 trillion money supply and then it is increased by, say, 10%, assuming that new money is spent in economic activities, GDP will ultimately rise more or less by 10% because GDP measures spending. More money equals more spending, thus higher GDP.

During this phase one might see manufacturing and consumption increase and even employment grow. This happened with QE1 and 2. However, one might ask, if money stimulus actually revives real economic growth, why did we need QE2? Of course this is the flaw in the above argument. It doesn't work.

These naive monetary theories don't work to create real growth, they just make the numbers go up ... temporarily. QE 1 or 2 did nothing to cure underlying economic problems or create lasting real growth. If QE had worked the economists at the Fed wouldn't be scratching their heads over the current negative economic data that has been pouring out recently. Today's unemployment report is a good example of this.

The BLS announced that only 80,000 new jobs were created in June, 2012, and the unemployment rate remained at 8.2%. Here is a good synopsis of the report from Econoday:

For a picture of the trend, this is also from Econoday:

As you can see, the first quarter job situation has been collapsing. There are still 12. 7 million Americans unemployed, 41.9% of the unemployed have been so for more than 27 weeks, and the broadest measure of unemployment (U-6) was 14.9% (+0.1%). For those of you wishing to see the so-called "U" data, please go here.

These results and the other data that we have been commenting on demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Fed as a kind of super-technocratic presence behind the economic curtain who through their wisdom and benevolence have the ability to successfully guide the economy. With declining numbers, the Fed is being exposed as the Wizard of Oz that it is. They should just admit that nothing they or the Administration has done has worked and perhaps question their theories.

What can we expect as a result of this report? Going back to my article on last month's employment report, it is this:

1. The Administration is seriously concerned since an election is only 5 months away.

2. The Fed is seriously concerned since none of their monetary policies are working as planned. 

3. “Inflation” as the Fed defines it is looking more like the much feared “deflation.” The Fed will not let “deflation” happen.

4. The only thing the Fed really knows how to do is print money, and since the inflation hawks on the FOMC have nothing to complain about, it makes another round of quantitative easing likely. And soon.

Now that our trading partners around the world, especially in the Eurozone, are failing for the same reasons, there will be even more pressure on the Fed to "do something." While they are trying to avoid another round of QE, I think there will be serious pressure from the Doves in the Fed to print. This will result in temporary market euphoria as the new money finds its way into the financial markets, but the Fed will discover that this third round of printing will have a weaker effect on the economy just as the result QE2 was weaker than QE1's. That means it will quickly fade and economic growth will continue to stagnate

Unnatural Disasters: Jobs, Wages, And Savings


This article originally appeared on the Daily Capitalist.

The U.S. recovery appears to be tracking a similar pattern of the past three years, in which the economy gains steam during the winter only to run down in the spring and summer. But the situation this time is puzzling, given that there hasn't been a gas-price spike—prices instead have fallen--or a disaster, such as last year's Japanese earthquake and tsunami.

The above comment is from the Wall Street Journal's story on Friday's poor employment report from the BLS. Piled on top of this was news that manufacturing is softening, wages and hours are declining, and the manufacturing PMIs for the UK, Eurozone, and China are declining. And we were informed yesterday that GDP is sinking. The U.S. markets reacted badly: most were down about 2.5%, with the Russel 2000 d0wn 3.2%.

The given explanations for these events are all wrong and they have been wrong since 2008 as mainstream economists are "surprised" on a regular basis. The news media on Friday offered no valid explanations of current events, and as I listened to the news, commentators were making it up as the went along, trying to make sense of what looks like a worldwide slowdown. Our fellow homo sapiens can't not try to explain events they don't understand.

What is causing the worldwide slowdown are not natural events but rather the result of man made policies from central banks and governments. Yet economists continue to recommend the same policies that caused the economic decline. Will things ever change?

Let's examine the data first.

Employment, the chief motivator of politicians and central bankers, was "surprisingly" (again, that word) weak. Here is a quick summary from Econoday:

New job creation was weak, the unemployment rate increased, hourly earnings were weak, disposable personal income was weak, the work week went down, and the all-important (to the Fed) PCE price index declined (April). This is not what our leaders expected. Here's a picture:

 For those of you looking for the detail on U-6, long-term unemployed, here is the table:

If I were Ben Bernanke or President Obama, I would like to see these data going the other way if I wanted to keep my job.

There is always a lot of controversy about the actual rate of employment as reflected in the number of employed versus the population at large or as compared to the workforce population. The official numbers are as follows: the population to employment ratio is 58.6% and the workforce to population ratio is 63.8%.

My fellow blogger Mish always does an excellent take on the dubious BLS calculations based on the birth-death model of business creation, the real ratio of a growing population to employed, and the dropout rate. I would refer you to his excellent article on these data.

Whatever the real story is, it isn't good.

Part of the data that I believe is most important, other than the headline numbers of growing unemployment, is the PCE price index and the personal savings rate.

As I mentioned above, the PCE price index went down in April (+0.1%) compared to March (+0.2%). To the Fed this smells like (i) recession and (ii) deflation.

The personal savings rate went down as well, to 3.4% in April as compared to 3.5% in March. This tells us that consumers are funding PCE with savings, since disposable personal income is flat (+0.2% in April, same as March).

What the fallout of these data is for planning purposes is:

1. The Administration is seriously concerned since an election is only 5 months away.

2. The Fed is seriously concerned since none of their monetary policies are working as planned. 

3. "Inflation" as the Fed defines it is looking more like the much feared "deflation." The Fed will not let "deflation" happen.

4. The only thing the Fed really knows how to do is print money, and since the inflation hawks on the FOMC have nothing to complain about, it makes another round of quantitative easing likely. And soon.

5. The decline in savings further diminishes the chances of a recovery since what the economy needs is (i) to liquidate the bad investments made during the boom (malinvestment) and (ii) capital from real savings to make it grow again. While one could argue that such "savings" are the product of two prior rounds of QE and not "real savings" as defined by Austrian economic theory, I don't think that is the case. A substantial part of these savings is "real savings" and it is being destroyed.

Mainstream economists treat our current mini-cycles as somewhat natural events, divorced from any action by the Fed and the Administration (see opening quote). One only need to look at Fed policies (QE, ZIRP, and money supply) as we "Austrians" do to get the real answers. 

Fed Policy: Bernanke Is Warming Up His Helicopter


This article originally appeared in the Daily Capitalist.

Economists cling to statistical data like barnacles in order to have some kind of anchor to explain what is going on in the world. They will try to cram the square data peg into the round holes of economic "laws" rather than abandon them when they are obviously wrong. Which is not a very satisfactory way to explain things. You might begin to think the data you measure is just coincidentally correlative for the period measured if it falls apart at some point. Instead of trying to stretch the data into what you think it should be, then maybe you might think that you've got it all wrong.

Chairman Ben Bernanke is not letting a data inconsistency get in the way of his prior conclusions about unemployment. In his speech today, he says that he's not sure why we have such high rates of unemployment, some may be just cyclical, some may be structural, but whatever it is the Fed will be available to print money to "support demand and for the recovery." Somehow QE1 and QE2 were not enough.

In his speech Bernanke tries to explain why Okun's law (a correlation between GDP and employment/unemployment) is still valid yet doesn't explain the current situation. Perhaps GDP "growth" Bernanke sees is really a figment of money steroids, something the Fed has unleashed, and that unemployment is still high because of long-term capital/savings destruction caused by QE and ZIRP. 

If you look at the rate of employment to the working population, you might wonder why it crashed so disproportionately to past cycles:

The blue line is the ratio of employment to population; the red line shows population growth. The population is still growing but the ratio fell off a cliff. The ratio of employed to population is back to 1977 levels. This is not something Chairman Bernanke wishes to hear or believe. He would rather adhere to the outdated ideas of the mainstream rather than question the dogma.

This is apropos of a conference sponsored by the Fed last Friday on, among other topics, the efficacy of quantitative easing. The conclusion coming from a Fed conference should be pretty obvious: QE is successful. The paper presented by economist Mark Gertler of NYU, a close collaborator with the former Professor Bernanke, concludes that QE works and he has an econometric model to prove it. What he does is look at what he considers to be the proper data and concludes that there is cause and effect and then he builds a mathematical model around this and believes it works. If his interpretation of the data is incorrect then the model is incorrect. 

Here is a portion, out of context, of Gertler's model:

Etcetera. You would have to be an econometrician to understand this. But it is just a way to disguise false ideology by cloaking it in mathematical formula. See Hayek and Mises on this topic. Because the formula "works" doesn't mean it is right. Believe what you want to believe.

I think this is mostly an ad hoc ergo propter hoc (A happened and then B happened, thus A caused B) kind of analysis and that his conclusions are based on incorrect theory and fail to explain anything. But it doesn't matter if he's right or wrong for our purposes because Bernanke and most of the people at the Fed believe it. We can thus be assured that the Fed will unleash another round of QE when the economy stagnates (as I have forecast that it will).

It matters if he's right or wrong for our purposes as investors though, because QE distorts the entire economy, gives an illusion of growth, destroys capital, causes more unemployment, and leaves the economy structurally impaired for a considerable time. One of the nasty little side-effects of QE that is most recognizable to investors and consumers is price inflation. It is probably higher than it is reported but it would grow much higher with more money printing. It destroys your wealth. It is possible, as we found out in the 1970s that you can have economic stagnation and high inflation at the same time.

What we are seeing now in the data is an effect from QE1 and QE2 and Operation Twist. It cannot last and it won't because you can't create wealth out of thin air as they are attempting to do. 

Bernanke's speech is another example of Mr. Bernanke's admission that he does not understand the fundamentals underlying our economic problems. Otherwise Fed policies he unleashed would have cured the problem long ago.

Just last Thursday in an econ class at George Washington University he said the Fed's low-interest-rate policies in the early 2000s didn't cause the housing boom and bust:

"There's no consensus on this," Mr. Bernanke told a class of college students at George Washington University. "But the evidence I've seen suggests that monetary policy did not play an important role in raising house prices during the upswing."

The housing boom-bust must have been caused by "irrational exuberance" which was Alan Greenspan's "animal spirits" Keynesian explanation for the Dotcom bubble. Greenspan has also denied that he caused the housing bubble. 

What can one say about this? There is actually very good evidence that the Fed's easy money policy was the fountainhead of the bubble. But readers of the Daily Capitalist are well aware of that.

These speeches are further confirmations of disastrous Fed monetary policies that won't end until the Fed raises interest rates and stops printing money. I'm betting on stagnation, more QE, and higher price inflation.

The Fluff and Puff of Arianna Huffington


The article originally appeared on the Daily Capitalist.

COMMENTARY

Arianna Huffington just wrote an "important" op-ed, "Delevering in a Delevering World".

I know flummery when I see it:

On Monday, I was in Newport Beach to speak at the annual client conference of PIMCO, the world's largest bond investment company -- whose CEO Mohamed El-Erian is a frequent and very popular HuffPost blogger. More than 300 of PIMCO's clients gathered for a three-day retreat around the timely theme of "Delivering in a Delevering World."

After tossing out the names of her good friends El-Erian and Bill Gross (both of whom I have previously awarded our Crony Capitalist of the Month accolades), she launches into the dogma being tossed around in Krugmanite neo-Keynesian circles that capitalism needs to be "compassionate" and fiscal "austerity" is "keeping us from growing."

If this were a serious piece by her she wouldn't have to rely on the pejorative style of composition to make her point. But she does and as such it becomes Party-speak. Here are some of the value-laden words she uses to describe the "problem" of "excessive" government cost cutting:

  • "relentless emphasis on cutting"
  • "misguided approach to delevering"
  • "imprudent delevering"
  • "premature austerity"
  • "excessive delevering"
  • "we also need delivering from the obsolete dogmas of the past"
  • "dysfunctional political and economic systems of the present"
  • "capitalism without conscience"

I'll cut to the chase and tell you that her argument is that those governments (including the U.S.) which have gone broke by borrowing massive sums supported on a sea of fiat money to fund welfare programs for their favorite constituents, and which have run into a wall trying to roll over their crappy paper, need to borrow and spend even more because "imprudent", "excessive", and "misguided" attempts to cut spending will set back any recovery because only government spending can get us out of this mess.

This approach to fundamentalist Keynesian economics believes that somehow it is government that creates wealth in an economy and that without the benevolent hand of the government we would just sink back into the muck. Instead of understanding that the bond markets are trying to tell us something about these economies, their cure is more of the same thing that got these economies in trouble in the beginning.

But no, these attempts at fiscal sanity aren't "compassionate" and capitalism without government's oversight has no conscience and causes prolonged unemployment and misery. Actually what will cause prolonged unemployment and misery are the policies she favors. If long-term stagnation, inflation, high permanent unemployment, and high taxes are your goal, then she and her friends have the right formulary.

And then she has the gall to quote Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as supporting her concept that capitalism lacks conscience.

I haven't read that work by Smith but I doubt Mrs. Huffington has either. I think she uses it as an intellectual embellishment to suit her argument and to give her an air of profundity. I did look up a paper on Theory of Moral Sentiments by Professor Jeffrey Hebener, ("An Integration of The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments") who describes the work this way:

... Smith discussed four ways in which capitalism "ennobles human nature." First, capitalism develops the impartial spectator (both internal and external). Second, it simultaneously develops self-command and humanity (the awful and amiable virtues). Third, Smith gives examples of how it develops virtue in man. Finally, capitalism develops a set of general rules of conduct that lead to moral activity.

Hebener concludes his study by saying:

When joined in this way, capitalism is the environment that prompts the prosperity of man's material and moral statures. Furthermore, this completes Smith's system. the Wealth of Nations contains his political ethics and Moral Sentiments constructs his views on personal ethics; integrating the two books reveals a real world environment for achieving his ethical goals.

In other words, Smith determined that capitalism, as he does properly define it, engenders moral virtue and material well-being. Mrs. Huffington suggests the opposite.

What can one expect from the publisher of the Huffington Post. She and some wealthy liberals founded it with big bucks to counter what they (amusingly) felt was the dominance of the "right wing media." They wished to make money too, so she turned a corner and sank into LCD (lowest common denominator) with articles on entertainment, celebrities and their divorces, nude photos, "business" (i.e., how the little guy is getting screwed), fashion, gay life, and things you would generally enjoy in a tabloid. She still does politics but the site is morbidly liberal.

She succeeded beyond anyone's wildest dreams (good luck, AOL). She took a successful formula from the British tabloids and applied it to the Web. I admire her success. Yes, she has a right to speak her mind on her site and to overtly promote herself and Huffpo.

But she's just parroting the liberal economic catechism that her claque are whispering in her ear; let not anyone think that her views on economics are anything but fluff and puff.

There Is No Such Thing As Harmless Price Inflation


This article originally appeared in the Daily Capitalist.

A "little" inflation will destroy capital, rob you of your savings, disrupt all of your long-term financial planning, create market instability, and leave you unprepared for retirement. You can protect yourself and you must.

Price Inflation

The Bureau of Labor Statistics released their official Consumer Price Index for February on Friday (up 0.4% MoM; up 2.9% YoY):

We also have the BLS seasonally the so-called "core" measure of prices ex. food and energy (up 0.1% MoM; up 2.2% YoY):

 

According to most economists including the Fed, this "inflation" is modest and acceptable, if not desirable. The 2.9% annual rate is more or less within the Fed's target for "inflation." 

There is much criticism about the CPI indicators. But, you can pick other measures. In fact inflation can be whatever you want it to be.

For example, if you are wary of the BLS measures, then there is John Williams of Shadowstats who has two measures. One is based on the same methodology that the BLS used in 1990 (up 6.2% YoY):

Or, if you prefer, there is his version of the BLS's 1980 base year methodology (up 10.2% YoY):

Or you can use the MIT Billion Price Project annual index which is up 2.8% as of February 1:

Another way to look at it is this way, the devaluation of the dollar since the creation of the Fed:

Today the value of the dollar is about 3¢ as measure from1913 when the Fed became our central bank.

Understand that there is a lot of criticism of each of these measures of prices. What each one is trying to tell us is how much our dollars have depreciated from month-to-month and year-to-year. 

I don't know which of the above is the correct measure. In fact I don't think there is a correct measure because it is a very complex problem to measure prices over time and everyone spends differently. I think the better measure is more related to money supply, but that is a different topic. In general I personally believe that prices are higher than what the BLS reports, but I'm not a statistician. 

I think the most important thing for us to know is (1) whether or not prices are constantly increasing at whichever method you choose, and (2) how fast the monthly and annual rates change. Steady price inflation will kill you over the longer term. Rapid changes in the rates of change can wipe you out.

I don't mean to state the obvious here, but we all need to protect ourselves from the dollar's devaluation or we will become poorer and poorer over time. I bring this up because I don't think most people understand what a "little inflation" can do to one's long-term financial plans. If prices rise a steady 3% per year, for example, I know my $1,000 savings is going to have to be $1,344 in ten years just to stay even (i.e., it's worth 34% less).  

And if you think assets and wages always keep up with prices, the past two recessions should dissuade you from that thought. Right now we have a situation where the dollar is continuing to devalue and workers wages are actually going down. Here is Friday's report on real (i.e., inflation adjusted) earnings (down 0.3%):

If the Fed keeps on creating these booms and busts which first lead people down a path of wealth destruction (what's your house worth now?) and then they devalue the dollar (i.e., "print" money) in order to try to stimulate a recovery but which further destroys capital, how can one get ahead? From the data, it seems that most people aren't getting ahead. In fact the system is now geared more toward the One Percenters who thrive on the financialization of the economy. 

The Fed knows exactly what it is doing. While the official line is that the U.S. wants a "strong" dollar, the Fed and the federal government are doing everything they can to devalue it. Chairman Bernanke believes that a little bit of inflation is an acceptable trade-off because it spurs economic growth. Why he thinks the destruction of wealth is the road to wealth is not a mystery: it is the foundation of contemporary economics of which he is an advocate. He understands that printing money causes prices to go up, and thus he is consciously devaluing the dollar. 

If printing money were the elixir of prosperity, bankers would have made us all rich long ago. It is too bad that Chairman Bernanke does not understand that Federal Notes are not wealth, but economic nanobots that consume and destroy that scarce resource, savings. Only the savings from the profits of production can create wealth.

What Do I Do?

"What do I do?" is the question I am asked most often. It depends on your level of wealth, but ... It is likely that the longer-term will see higher price inflation than what we are now experiencing so this is a serious question.

I'm not trying to avoid the issue on how to protect your wealth, but we don't give investment advice here. DoctoRx who follows markets at the Daily Capitalist has an excellent track record on investments, so I urge you to pay attention to him. 

I will give you some categories of investment that anyone seeking to protect themselves from price inflation should consider:

Gold. You can buy physical gold or shares in companies that hold gold. The Doc has recommended PHYS in the past. The point is that gold is money, and is a refuge against instability.

Oil and Gas. This product will be in demand until cold fusion or the perfect sun-powered battery is invented. I like the idea of actually owning production and there are reputable drilling programs one can invest in.

Agricultural production. Food will always be in demand in an unstable world. This usually means investing in ag land, but there are farming partnerships one can invest in if one isn't a farmer. 

Stocks and bonds. I'm not a big believer in buy and hold, so you've got to know what you are doing, or you've got to invest in someone who does. I personally follow DoctoRx. There are many others, but you've got to do the research. Be wary of "track records." There are still more Madoffs out there. The irony is that anyone with a fabulous track record (hedge funds and investment advisers) can require millions to hundreds of millions to get in. Most of the rest who invite you in eventually go to the mean (at best) or blow up (worst case).

Offshore assets. This is a bit of a snake pit, but investing in fast growing companies in friendly economies is a way to diversify out of the U.S. You can't hide assets from your Uncle Sam, but ... you can get good returns.

These suggestions aren't new and many advisers who follow the Daily Capitalist or sites like it (are there any?) say the same things. So I am not telling you anything new. 

This is a serious game. It is no secret that most Boomers don't have enough assets to allow themselves to retire. I fear that most retirees will be reliant on the government to take care of them (Social Security and Medicare). If you have saved, but stuck the assets in a CD, you are getting poorer and poorer as those nanobots destroy your savings. It's not an easy task and you can thank the Fed and the federal government for that. 

Here are my basic rules:

  1. You've got to have a plan and you must save. You must not spend all of your income. This seems so simple, yet few people really do it. There are many books on the topic of planning for retirement and how much you need to save. There are retirement counselors who can help you devise a plan. Just be careful of what they are selling. 

  2. You've got to do your own research and do not accept anything on the basis of a word or promise.

  3. You must check advisers out. Don't accept a demonstration portfolio, rather ask to talk to other clients and see their real-time results. If they can't provide the information, go elsewhere.

  4. Don't give anyone your money to invest without keeping it in a segregated account. I understand that there are partnership deals and mutual funds where this isn't possible. Investment advisers can have discretionary authority, but the money should remain in your name.

  5. Does the person or firm giving advice have deep pockets? Are they audited by a prominent company?

  6. Don't pay attention to those who sell fear. We've all seen the ads on the Web about the certainty of imminent collapse. I'm not exactly an optimist about the economy, but fear as a sales tool has a false ring. 

  7. Generally those who have been around a long time have some credibility and staying power. Of course Madoff was a Wall Street fixture, but there is a good example of accepting his word on faith.

  8. Stock brokers sell what their company tells them to sell. If they were really good, they would be running their own investment firm. As we have seen even the "great" companies such as Goldman Sachs can fail to serve their clients' interests.

  9. Pay attention to the business cycle. This is one of the things we try to analyze here at the Daily Capitalist. Where you are in the cycle is one of the most important thing an investor can know. Buying a home in 2008 would have been a bad move. Buying groceries.com before the Dotcom crash would have been a bad move.

  10. If it's too good to be true, it isn't. Of course this is the Ponzi scheme hook. My theory is that boom-bust business cycles have created a meme of constant speculation in our society. People think that "the Big Guys" always have the inside scoop and that's why they get rich (but see Lehman Bros.). They lose out on one cycle and when the next one starts and making money seems easy, they want in. This leads to susceptibility to Ponzi artists and advisers who confuse their boom phase success with intelligence (they quickly blow up in the bust). 

This is hard work. But remember that we are all in the same boat. 

Good luck.

Ugly = Beautiful; Beautiful = Ugly: Ray Dalio On Deleveraging


This article originally appeared on The Daily Capitalist.

I've been working on an article about the state of economic recovery and have been studying deleveraging, debt levels, bank balance sheets, foreclosures, and the like. So I was very pleased to find a long research piece put out by Bridgewater's Ray Dalio on that topic. As readers may know, I am a fan of Dalio and I appreciate his often unique and out-of-the-box view of the markets and the economy. Bridgewater also agrees with my belief that the economy is heading for stagnation and decline this year.

Dalio's piece was very disappointing because it was an incorrect look at how business cycles work and the role of deleveraging and the liquidation of malinvestment. It may actually lead one to make bad investment decisions.  Because Bridgewater's macro economic forecast came to conclusions similar to mine, I had assumed that perhaps they had done a somewhat "Austrian" analysis, but now I question that. Again, as I mentioned in the above article, you don't have to be "Austrian" reach similar conclusions, but they would have to look at indicators an "Austrian" would look at and interpret them in the same way.

Dalio's article, "An In-Depth Look at Deleveragings" is apparently authored by him. It concludes that the best way to "deleverage" is a "proper" combination of debt reduction (defaults and restructurings) and debt monetization (monetary inflation). This is what he considers to be a "beautiful" deleveraging whereas deleveraging by debt reduction and austerity are "ugly." The ugly ones cause recessions/depressions and deflation which is bad. Beautiful deleveragings minimize debt reduction and revive economies with monetary stimulation.

Unfortunately this is a very conventional view and it is wrong. 

I'm not going to get into the entire 31 page article, but he examines six historical events that supposedly exemplify "beautiful" and "ugly" deleveragings. They are the U.S. Great Depression (1930-1932), Japan (1990 to present), Spain (9/2008 to present), UK (1947-1969), and U.S. 9/2008 to 2/2009 (pre-QE). At the end he tackles an analysis of the Weimar hyperinflation. 

I'm not as familiar with the UK and Spain, but I am familiar with both U.S. events and the Weimar hyperinflation. Dalio unfortunately accepts the conventional wisdom of contemporary neo/Keynesian-Classical-Monetarist econometric analysis of these events and fails to understand most of the real causes underlying these crises. To save you the suspense, he believes that the current boom-bust cycle is an example of a "beautiful" deleveraging.

Dalio defines a beautiful deleveraging as one "in which enough 'printing' occurred to balance the deflationary forces of debt reduction and austeri9ty in a manner in which there is positive growth, a falling debt/income ratio and nominal GDP growth above nominal interest rates."

He says,

Thus far, this deleveraging would win our award of the most beautiful deleveraging on record. The key going forward will be for the policy makers to maintain balance so that the debt/income ratio keeps declining in an orderly way.

What he is saying is that the Fed's policy of ZIRP, debt guarantees, and QE avoided a disaster, prevented a collapse of the credit markets, and has allowed deleveraging to occur on a more or less orderly basis, and has promoted growth. He notes that the credit markets are "largely healed" and that "private section credit growth is improving."

This is the Conventional View of the Crisis and he, like most people holding this view, are engaging in a wishful thinking analysis of how things occurred. One could believe that a chariot pulled the sun across the heavens every day, and because the sun came up every day, this analysis is correct. We understand that there are other forces at work. But he is not alone in his conclusions. 

He uses a monetarist view which says that tinkering with money supply can prevent the worst from happening. He sees the problem as one in which there was a shortage of money which caused the bust, rather than it being the result of "money printing". If the Fed could have prevented the worst from happening by printing money, then all of our problems would be solved. Unfortunately for the monetarists at the Fed, including Mr. Bernanke, they have yet to achieve their goal.

Dalio also takes a classical view of the economy as one big aggregate machine which can be properly measured by GDP. His main measure of the problem is the amount of debt to GDP, a measure which really doesn't tell us much. All GDP can tell us is how much money was spent at any given time. At best it is a rough measure; at worst it is a misleading measure because the data is not revealing of what really happened in an economy where millions of individual decisions are made every day. The amount of debt versus GDP tells us nothing about the role of debt, the value of underlying assets, the ability of pay debt, whether the debt was built on monetary steroids or real economic activity, or really anything. "Economies" don't incur debt, people do.

Further he measures everything in nominal terms which makes any conclusion misleading without at least trying to apply a deflator to the measure. Then one has to choose the right deflator to determine if the measured activity was really positive or negative. It is many Austrians' belief that price inflation is actually much higher than officially stated and that there are a number of ways to game the data to make it look better. I have written many times about this and my conclusion is that what we are seeing as "growth" is actually a data fiction because it fails to properly measure the impact of price inflation. In fact what we are seeing as "growth" now is really a further destruction of capital by investors and businesses.

He then uses a neo-Keynesian econometric methodology to interpret and analyze the results. That is, tinkering with the big machine called "the economy" can more or less solve our problems if it is done just right. And we all know that the tinkerers have done a great job of "running" the economy. In fact the current policies proposed and implemented by mainstream economists have been failures and have resulted in an increasingly unstable and fragile economy.

Thus faith in all that tinkering, especially by the Fed, caused the boom-bust credit cycle, and further tinkering with QE and ZIRP, plus the Fed's and the federal government's role in preventing a liquidation of malinvestment has only caused the economic pain to be stretched out much longer than it otherwise would have had the government had not interfered. Further, these policies have only served to create further future instability and economic risk. Other than that his analysis is fine.

What he calls "ugly", an austerity and debt reduction, is actually "beautiful". While it is painful, it is painful for a much shorter period of time and enables the "economy", i.e., people, to go bankrupt, repair their finances, start saving again, create new capital, and then create new economic growth and jobs. By preventing or delaying this process the policy makers only doom us to economic stagnation, inflation, and permanent high unemployment. And I fear that is exactly where we are headed.

The ‘High Oil Prices = Recession’ Fallacy


Every time we see oil prices go up we hear that it will cause inflation and/or the economy will go into the tank.

... 7 out of the 8 postwar U.S. recessions had been preceded by a sharp increase in the price of crude petroleum. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led to a doubling in the price of oil in the fall of 1990 and was followed by the ninth postwar recession in 1990-91. The price of oil more than doubled again in 1999-2000, with the tenth postwar recession coming in 2001. Yet another doubling in the price of oil in 2007-2008 accompanied the beginning of recession number 11, the most recent and frightening of the postwar economic downturns. So the count today stands at 10 out of 11, the sole exception being the mild recession of 1960-61 for which there was no preceding rise in oil prices. [Hamilton, 2009. Rv. 2010]

The premise is wrong. What causes price inflation is an expansion of money supply (and a desire of people to spend it, often quickly). What causes recessions is malinvestment of capital caused, again, by money supply expansion.

The classic argument is that because 70% of the economy is driven by consumer spending, an increase in gasoline prices will cause a decrease in consumer spending, which will cause an economic decline. Sounds logical on its face. There are empirical studies that show either increases in gasoline prices will not impact discretionary spending (McCarthy, 20110) or that large increases in petroleum prices will cause recessions (Hamilton). Take your pick.

The above chart1 shows the peak of real YoY GDP percentage change (light blue lines) and the relative price of gasoline (red), the product that most directly affects consumers. If gasoline prices have been increasing prior to the peak, then there is statistical data showing that those prices may have had an impact on GDP. From that one might conclude that because oil prices were rising prior to the peak in GDP, and because GDP subsequently declined, then high oil prices may have caused a decline in GDP.  (Because A happened and then B happened, thus A caused B?) Or, is it just a coincidence?

 What we see in the data is coincidence rather than confirmation.

Take price increases of oil and gasoline. It doesn't cause price inflation (i.e., all prices rise). Instead it's a supply and demand thing. When OPEC jacks up oil prices, people spend more on gas and less on other things. The consumer goods they don't buy decline in price. Money is redirected by market forces to petroleum producers who are incentivized to discover and produce more oil. Ultimately, under normal circumstances, prices come down. This process is a bit distorted because we have a cartel-controlled market. But, if OPEC keeps prices too high, people reduce consumption, cartel revenues go down, and OPEC reduces prices to stimulate consumption. This is what happened in the current business cycle. 

It is the same with recessions and oil prices. Each of the recessions we've had in the last 40 years can be adequately explained by causes other than oil/gas prices. For example, while oil/gas prices shot up prior to the 2008 Crash, no one suggests that was a cause of it. Rather we know that oil prices went up as a result of a fiat money fueled boom that drove up all commodity prices.

Looking at our chart, we can start with the 1973 - 1975 recession. That was the time of the Arab Oil Embargo (Oct. 1973 to March 1974). If the theory that high oil prices equals recession holds true then why did the economy recover when gas prices continued to rise post-recovery? What really happened was that the Fed cut interest rates by half in 1970-1971, and then started raising them in 1973 to combat rising prices. By the time the recession started in November 1973, the Fed Funds rate peaked at just over 10%. It isn't as if the oil embargo didn't cause disruption in the economy; it did, but most of the economic disruption was caused by the government's price controls and rationing. But it didn't cause the recession.

Next, GDP peaked in April 1978  (gasoline-PPG $0.631) and declined until October 1980 ($1.223). Recall that price inflation almost hit 15% in 1980.  The recession started in January 1980 ($1.11) and ended in July 1980 ($1.247). Gasoline prices continued to increase during the subsequent recovery. There is no correlation between oil prices and recession or price inflation.

GDP peaked again in Q2 1981 ($1.353) and bottomed out in November 1982 ($1.268). We went into recession in July 1981 ($1.353) until November 1982 ($1.268). You can see an oil price correlation here, but other things were going on: high inflation. By June 1981, the CPI was still over 10%. Carter had appointed Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman in August 1979 and he started raising the Fed Funds rate from around 10% until it reached 19% in January 1981, and kept it high (8% to 10%) for much his term (ended in 1987). This broke price inflation (it settled in the 3.5 to 4.5 range). Thus monetary policy rather than oil prices was the cause of the recession. 

From then on, gasoline prices declined and remained relatively stable until 1999 ($0.90 to $1.30) when it started climbing again. The July 1990 ($1.139) to March 1991 ($1.138) recession shows that GDP peaked in late 1987 (about $0.95) and gasoline prices peaked in January 1991 ($1.304) and the recession ended in March 1991. But again, other things were driving the economy: a real estate boom-bust cycle, and that was largely driven by cheaper money and accelerated depreciation rules (those rules ended in 1986). 

Prices fluctuated but remained in the $1.20s for most of the next eight years.

By 1999, the rise in gasoline prices coincided with peak GDP in late 1999 (Dec., $1.353) and gas prices rose, almost steadily since then. The 2001 recession came and went (March-$1,503) — November-$1.324). But, what else was going on? This was a time of incredible production and technological innovation that again benefited from the Fed's cheap money (spurred by Greenspan to revive the economy from the 1990 - 1991 recession). It worked. But Dot Com boom turned into Dot Bomb bust as the Fed raised interest rates and cooled the economy off from its "irrational exuberance".

The Fed decided it needed to stimulate the economy from the bust and from November 2000 to June 2004, the Fed lowered interest rates from 6.5% to 1.00%. From then on oil prices followed commodities prices and gasoline prices continued to climb.

By late 2003 ($1.578) the rate of growth of GDP peaked and thereafter was slowing, although it continued to grow until January 2006 ($2.359). At this point, the Fed again sought to cool down the economy and the Fed Funds rate went from 1.00% up to 5.26% by July 2007. Again, it worked and the real estate markets began to come apart. By H2 2008 ($4.142), GDP began to decline, thus beginning the bust phase of our current boom-bust cycle. Current price is $3.591.

Thus, while you can argue that rising oil and gas prices may have had some negative effects on the economy because of some economic disruption, in every case, the cause of our recession was anything but rising prices.

Regardless you are still going to hear that rising oil and gas prices are going to ruin the economy and cause us to go back into recession. While I believe the economy will decline starting in H2 2012, the reasons have nothing to do with oil prices. Don't let the pundits scare you with this economic fallacy. There is enough to worry about.

 


1. Note that gasoline prices (red line) are not scaled to prices, but are scaled to an index (100). The GDP scale (blue line) shows YoY percent change.

Commodities Were So 2011: This Year It’s Tech’s Turn to Pop & (Maybe) Top


This article is by DoctoRx, the pseudonym of an investor with a very successful 30-year track record. This article and DoctoRx are from the Daily Capitalist.

*****

Large IPOs often mark tops within sectors and within stock markets as a whole.  In June 2007, shortly after the s*** had begun to hit the fan in the financial stocks, the Blackstone Group (BX) was able to get a multi-billion dollar IPO in.  About a year and a half later, BX was down about as much as the Dow Jones fell between its 1929 peak and its mid-1932 nadir--almost 90%.  Talk about getting out on the last helicopter leaving Saigon! 

Fast forward a few years until the indigestion amongst Western investors allowed them to stomach a "hot" non-Chinese IPO:

Last year, Glencore (a gigantic commodities trading company) announced it was going to float an about $60 billion IPO in London and Hong Kong.  It went public in May; the stock promptly went straight down, just as Blackstone had done 4 years earlier.  Was it a coincidence that spring 2011 also marked the top for most commodities and almost all commodity stocks?  

Then, last year, memories of the crash had finally faded enough that it became time for U.S. investors to become the quacking ducks that, as always, Wall Street had food for.  And of course, tech was there as the most palatable food.  First there was LinkedIn (LNKD) in May, then Pandora Media (P), which is half off its high; then Groupon and Zynga.

Recently, Facebook decided it was time to liquefy its stock.  This is the Big tech IPO for this cycle.  This IPO will make the year for many in the financial community.  The valuation is bruited to be around $100 B.  We are definitely not at a 1999 level of insanity, as all the above companies are "real".  But these stocks are, in general, overvalued-or at least were, at the times of their 2011 IPOs as listed above (it's too soon to comment on FaceBook).  These companies have few tangible assets and have immense competitive challenges to justify their current valuation.  I know from an insider at FB that the private market valuation -soon to be the public valuation- has skyrocketed over the past year-and-a-half.  But I doubt that there has been all that much surprise in that same time frame in its operating results- after all, Facebook was the clear winner in its space by 2010.  So my view is that the price has been marked up for retail distribution.  All in a day's work for the Street.   

In the period until the FB IPO is expected this spring, I would be on the watch for market patterns to recur, and here are two examples of how they are currently in fact happening.

First- JPMorgan Chase has now put out a detailed, bullish research report on AAPL.  Now.  Talk about being late to the party!  JPM is not necessarily a player against which to be contrary, especially in the short term.  But let us note that there are not a lot of avowed bears on AAPL's stock valuation in the mainstream investment community.  Second, and even worse, a posting yesterday raised in all seriousness the question of whether there would be a shortage of AAPL stock should demand for it spike through the roof in the event the company declared a cash dividend.  A shortage of stock?  LOL- that reminds me of the alleged shortage of Treasurys in 2000 given the prospect for unending budget surpluses.  When the media starts positing a shortage of stocks or bonds...uh-oh...  (Note I am long AAPL.)

All may be well, and all manner of things may be well in investment-land despite this discussion.  What I am saying is definitely not a timing call, but my point is to remind readers that these major IPOs and runs of hot IPOs in a single sector do not happen in a vacuum.  They are not the result of a philanthropic attitude amongst corporate insiders or the financial community.  Facebook could raise every penny it needs, and more, from private sources.  UPS stayed private for so long as it grew massively that a regular system of stock sales occurred to let long-termers cash out their UPS stock.  Facebook does not need to become a public company to get known.  If the insiders are planning to generate unanticipated profits on an undreamed of scale, why share them with us?  Why accept the costs and scrutiny of being a public company?

In contrast, there's nothing like investing in a neglected market or "discredited" but essential sector to provide a long-term margin of safety (i.e., think different)- for an individual investor trying to time hot plays.  Might that be, for example, U.S. natural gas exploration companies or small strong community banks?  Is Wall Street cheerleading either of those sectors right now?  The answer is "No".  Thus, there may be good long-term relative value in those sectors- as well as the usual garbage, one should point out.  

I think that most individuals should take a Roman view when the FB books are opened to the public.  

Caveat emptor:  let the buyer beware. 

Is This Recovery?


This article originally appeared on The Daily Capitalist.

There is a lot of good news to buoy the markets and give cheer to the public. We hear that new jobless claims are down another 15,000 to 358,000, the ninth week of declines out of the last ten, finally breaking below the 400,000 mark. A reduction in unemployment is a very positive sign and is politically significant. Also Gallup released its latest economic confidence poll and it is up to -20, the highest in 12 months, a very solid gain from the -54 score in August and September.  We heard as well that Greece may qualify for another round of funding to stay default (we are very skeptical of that). And, the S&P is very close to its 52-week high.

There is more. The official CPI was up 2.4% last year, a very modest and tolerable amount according to the Fed. Markit reports that the combined U.S. ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing indices were up from 56.4 in December to 58.9 in January, hitting its highest level since March of last year. New orders in both surveys were up significantly. These data were backed up by reports of durable goods orders and factory orders. Data from many of the regional Feds confirm this.

Personal income increased 4.7% in 2011 versus an increase of 3.7% in 2010. Real disposable personal income (DPI) increased 0.9% compared with an increase of 1.8% in 2010. Real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased 2.2%, compared with an increase of 2.0% in 2010. State tax revenues increased 6.1% YoY according to the latest report.

What could possibly go wrong?

Are we in a recovery or not? This article will deal with this issue. I will briefly recap how we got here and the problems we need to overcome before we can call it a recovery. I will look at the reasons behind our current positive data. And then I will compare the current data to see where we are. 

What is holding back recovery?

Economic recovery is quite simple when you think about it: bad investments and their supporting debt need to be liquidated. These bad deals are called "malinvestment" and our recent housing boom left huge piles of them for us to clean up. Think of it as the detritus of bad economic policies that led to bad business decisions. Massive amounts of capital (consisting of real and fiat "paper" capital) were lost during the resulting bust and there is nothing anyone can do about it. Keeping bad deals alive only serves to trap valuable capital into unproductive assets and delays recovery. New capital must be created through real "organic" production to get the economy going again.

The biggest piles of detritus to clean up before the U.S. economy can recover are:

  • The asset and capital structure of our local and regional banks, mostly as related to real estate loans;
  • The debt of small business owners, especially in relation to commercial real estate holdings;
  • The debt of households in relation to home mortgages, student loans, and consumption-related debt.

All of the above have been important contributors to the stagnation of our economy. And all of the above, except student loans, have to do with real estate.

There certainly are other major issues this country needs to deal with that will also affect economic recovery. Those issues are political in nature and will depend in large part on the outcome of the 2012 elections. They are our budget deficit and huge national debt, tax policies, social welfare entitlement programs, and regulations which negatively impact capital formation and business expansion. These issues are not within the scope of this article but we have discussed them frequently here at The Daily Capitalist.

There is one further policy matter that is political in nature and that will impact the economy, and that is Fed policy which I will discuss.

Will consumer spending drive the economy? 

Most economists and analysts point to the lack of consumer demand as being the economy's greatest hurdle, but that is a symptom of a serious underlying problem rather than the cause. The cause is what Austrian theory economists call a lack of "real savings" (real capital). That lack occurs because, as noted above, the boom-bust business cycle, which we are still in the midst of, destroyed huge amounts of real capital/savings. (Household wealth declined by $10 trillion, for example.) We need real capital in order to have new production; without it, the economy stagnates.

To get production going manufacturers need to buy capital goods and commodities in order to make things. If they haven't been produced and you have a fistful of fiat dollars, then there is nothing to buy and nothing to produce. If we could print real savings we would already be in recovery which tells us that fiat money, the stuff that the Fed creates out of thin air, is not real wealth. Real savings can only come from the production of things that consumers, or the manufacturers of consumer goods, want. Profits saved from such production or from saved wages of workers employed to make such goods, is real capital/savings.

The bottom line is that if we had enough real capital/savings, we would have already recovered. The fact that we haven't recovered means that we don't have enough real capital/savings. Flogging the consumer to spend will only impoverish the consumer and destroy more capital. Consumers need to save, not spend.

Will manufacturing drive the economy?

Manufacturing is an important part of our economy, but not as important as it was. The production of goods represents only 24% of the economy (services are 47%). There is no question that recently manufacturing has been improving. It is being driven mainly by manufacturing exports and auto sales.

What is causing this?

There are two parallel functions occurring that are giving rise to the current good economic news. One is the natural forces that cause an economy to recover. The other is the Fed's policies to devalue the dollar and keep interest rates artificially low.

When I refer to "natural forces" causing a recovery, I am talking about market forces such as the liquidation of debt related to malinvestments, the devaluation of those malinvestments, and the formation of new real capital/savings. It is occurring naturally, often despite government policies, and is clearing the way for new production. But I believe it has been a very slow process and has not been sufficient to cause most of the positive economic news. I will discuss this in some detail in another article coming soon.

Much of the recent good economic news comes as a result of the Fed's cheap dollar policy. It does two things to stimulate manufacturing:

First, fiat money devalues a currency. This is obvious to us as we look at a constant positive inflation rate and the decline of the dollar in relation to most other currencies. That devaluation makes U.S. goods appear to be relatively cheaper on foreign markets and stimulates demand for them.  Thus a cheap dollar policy stimulates exports. 

Second, the Fed's zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) which has driven down interest rates, stimulates demand for certain big ticket goods such as autos. 

Exports

 Exports represent about 14% of GDP and of that manufacturing exports is about 5% of GDP: a substantial factor. So when the dollar declines it stimulates exports and this is going a long way to revive manufacturing in the U.S. 

The following chart shows the decline of the dollar (blue), the level of exports (red). I have inserted the two incidents of quantitative easing as shown in the salmon and light green bars. It is easy to see the mirror image inverse relationship of rising exports and a declining dollar. 

  The recent strengthening of the dollar, a result of the eurozone crisis driving the dollar up, and declining world economies do not point to continued strong export growth. This is already starting to show up in the numbers as this chart shows more clearly (gray bars):

The below chart of leading indicators, just out from the OECD, shows that the world is not cooperating with exporters—these are their major markets:

 

Autos

Auto production is about 2.5% of GDP, a substantial part of manufacturing. Recent sales improvement is being driven by cheap credit (ZIRP). This chart shows new car sales (blue), expanding nonrevolving credit (red), and auto loan interest rates (black):

The first thing you should notice is the high level of sales pre-Crash and its rapid decline in 2008 (blue). Note the spike in 2009 which was the ill-conceived Cash for Clunkers program. Nonrevolving credit is used mainly for financing autos and this chart shows the post-Crash rise of such credit growing in lock-step with auto sales. It also shows a significant spike in sales beginning in 2010 as auto loan interest rates decline (black) to historic lows. While recent sales growth is also a function of pent-up demand as consumers replace worn out vehicles, in an economy where consumer debt is still very high and where consumer income has been flat, most of these auto sales are being spurred on by low ZIRP-driven financing costs, not just organic demand.

Industrial production

The other thing is that industrial production is not growing strongly as the headlines would have you believe. If it was strong, it would be a good indicator of positive growth and the presence of real capital/saving driving growth. While factory orders and industrial production have improved, they have been essentially flat-to-declining for the past 12 months:

 

Improvements in manufacturing and industrial output are largely being driven by Fed policy, QE and ZIRP. I don't believe it will last because it appears that monetary growth and the rate of change of such growth, are declining as the effects of QE wear off. 

The role of money supply

If much of our positive economic data, especially manufacturing, employment, and price inflation is tied to monetary policy, then that begs the questions of where is money supply (MS) now, where is it heading, and what will the Fed do?

The Fed has been trying to stimulate the economy by making credit available to banks, by keeping interest rates (Fed Funds) at near zero (ZIRP), and by direct injections of money into the economy (QE, quantitative easing). Those policies as anticipated by the Fed have largely failed. In a truly recovering economy, credit would be expanding because businesses would be borrowing in order to expand and hire. Interest rates would be so attractive to borrowers, they couldn't resist expanding through borrowing. The problem is that it hasn't worked.

What is happening instead is that economic gains are coming largely from quantitative easing, a once-in-a-lifetime policy of last resort. While Chairman Bernanke denies it, creating money out of thin air (QE) has the same effect as printing new currency and throwing it out of the Chairman's proverbial helicopter.

Look at how QE has expanded the Fed's balance sheet from securities purchased on the open market, which  is how the Fed creates new money:

As you can see, its balance sheet exploded during the Crash (QE1) and has continued to grow (QE2). The Fed has injected about $2 trillion into the economy since 2008.  One can't deny that such injections have impacted the economy. It has rewarded the financial markets (S&P500: 3/6/09=666; 2/14/12=1,350), it has rewarded the multinationals and exporters, and it has caused a positive CPI despite massive deflationary forces.

MS itself has been on a rocky track, but it has expanded in response to QE. Bank credit expansion (loans) is the easiest way to cause MS to grow. While the Fed has made massive amounts of credit available to banks, without loan demand lenders are satisfied to keep it locked up at the Fed (excess reserves). Without landing activity, in order to make MS grow, the Fed has found it must inject new money directly into the economy via QE . 

To measure MS, I use the Austrian concepts of money supply, what is called "Austrian" or "True" money supply. Specifically I use what I consider to be the most accurate "Austrian" data which is from Michael Pollaro's The Contrarian Take (with his kind permission), which looks like this:

As you can see the percentage YoY change of TMS2 (bright blue line), the data which I think is most accurate, is actually declining. What does this mean?

Let me try to explain this with a more detailed, and unfortunately, a more complicated chart. This is the same chart as above with an addition of the QE events (vertical salmon and blue bars), the addition of GDP data (black line), and the addition of the NBER's dates for the Great Recession as a vertical gray bar. The scale on the inside of the chart on the left shows quarterly changes in GDP from 2006 to Q4 2011, and it is shown on the black line. I have exaggerated GDP by showing percentage changes of GDP on a quarterly basis to make it fit to Pollaro's chart and to make my point clearer. Another chart below shows GDP alone.

 What I believe this chart shows is that, after a delay, quantitative easing has caused much of the "recovery" by increasing MS which in turn has increased GDP .

In terms of measuring money supply, I use the bright blue line (TMS2) which shows annualized changes. If you are a believer in M2, Pollaro shows that as well (dark blue line). QE1, starting in November 2007 and ending in March 2008, brought a huge infusion of new money into the economy, about $1.3 trillion in only 3 months. The Fed, as you recall, went on a massive buying campaign which including a lot of "bad" assets (GSE debt, etc.). GDP is a lagging indicator, but as you can see it was well on its way down by Q1 2007 as real estate values collapsed and Lehman went under. By Q4 2009 GDP started to pick up which was a 6-month lag from the end of QE1. 

As the effects of QE1 wore off, as one would expect it to do in the face of massive deflationary forces, GDP began to stall out and unemployment continued to climb. By October, 2009 unemployment reached 10%, and people were talking about a jobless recovery. GDP peaked in Q4 2009 and started declining again in Q1 2010. The Fed took action starting in November 2009 through June, 2010, and QE2 brought another $600 billion of new fiat money into the economy over a four month period. GDP bottomed out in Q1 2011 and since then it has been expanding but at a snail's pace. On a YoY basis GDP is stagnating, but not declining. Again, there was about a 6-month lag between the end of QE2 and GDP turnaround.

Here is a chart that makes it easier to see real GDP:

To those out there who see this as an exercise in curve fitting, faulty logic (post hoc ergo propter hoc), or Monetarist theory, these data are consistent with Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) and one would expect to see these results after flooding the economy with fiat money. I believe that the gains, such as they are, are not "real" in the sense that they are not based on real savings, but on fiat money which always redirects capital into projects that eventually will become malinvestments.

When money is injected in the QE fashion, it takes longer for the money to get into the farther reaches of the economy. When you think about it, the cash initially goes to the Fed's Prime Dealers and they use it to make investments, which indirectly leads to productive activities, but takes time to expand beyond, say, New York City. Bank credit expansion through loans is a more direct transmission into productive activities rather than investment activities (businesses borrow to expand business, consumers borrow to buy homes and cars).

The thing about GDP is that it is not necessarily a very good measure of economic activity in the sense that it measures what we spend. If you inject more fiat money into the economy it means there will be more spending and a higher GDP. More spending doesn't always mean that those activities will be productive and lasting. That is especially the case with QE. But, for whatever it's worth, the world pays attention to GDP and so will we; it's just very tricky footing for forecasters.

It appears that TMS2 MS growth is declining. One look at the above chart will confirm this. This has to do with a lot of factors, but mainly it is occurring because QE2 is wearing off. This is occurring despite the fact that we are finally seeing modest increases in bank lending activity:

The above chart shows total loan activity (blue line) and the components that are business loans (red line) and consumer loans (green line). Ignore the straight line increase in Q2 2010; that is a recalculation based on a change of the government's methodology. While it shows recent modest improvement, loans have not grown since April, 2010. The latest Fed data (H8) shows that consumer loans actually declined 0.7% YoY in 2011 and business loans only grew 1.7% YoY. The commercial and industrial (C&I) portion of business loans were up a very positive 9.6%. The problem is that there are fewer potential borrowers, and the value of C&I business loans has actually declined (blue line):

Another MS factor to consider is what is happening in Europe. The European Central Bank and the Bank of England are inflating: the ECB with purchases of sovereign bonds and LTRO (Long-term Refinancing Operations), and from QE with the Bank of England. According to Michael Pollaro, some of this money is finding its way back to U.S. Treasurys.

That being the case, declining MS growth is likely a stronger trend than is apparent.

Where are we?

QE has finally given the economy a bit of a ride, but it appears that it is running its course, otherwise, we would see healthier bank credit expansion, and an increasing MS without Fed money steroids, and that isn't happening yet. 

Exports are the other thing to be watched as the EU, China, and the rest of the world slow down. Whatever one thinks of the role of U.S. exports, this is a serious negative factor. Recall that exports are about 10% of our economy and are seen by most analysts as an important driver of our economy.

Based on these data, it is likely that the U.S. will start to see more weakness in the economy during Q2-Q3 2012. The timing is based on the fact that this "recovery" is fragile in the sense that it has been supported more by fiat money stimulus rather than real capital/savings. The data show that as MS declines, the economy, at least as represented by GDP, reacts rather quickly and negatively.

The issue really comes down to whether or not bank credit will take off again. If we consider the present state of deleveraging and liquidation of malinvestments, we are about half-way to the end zone. (This will be the subject of my next article.) Also, while C&I loans are growing, modestly, real estate loans and consumer loans are still weak. The NFIB reports that small business credit demand is still tepid, relatively unchanged for 2011. Small businesses represent about one-half of the U.S. economy. Thus it is unlikely that MS will expand from an orgy of borrowing.

That leaves the Fed with only one effective tool in their proverbial toolbox. That is, of course, QE3. 

What other tools do they have? They could pay no interest on excess reserves, or even charge interest on reserves, but I don't think it will force banks to lend because there isn't enough demand to drain reserves. As Michael Pollaro pointed out, it is more likely that banks will run into loan limits because of capital ratio constraints before they tap into excess reserves. As well, while there is some easing of credit terms, it is unlikely that consumers will go on a spending/borrowing binge for the reasons mentioned above. More Operation Twist? Unlikely. Low interest rates aren't the problem, ZIRP has seen to that.

Conclusion

Quantitative easing has only been used once before in U.S. history, and that was during the Great Depression. You might wish to ponder that bit of information. What that is telling us is that we cannot compare what is occurring now to our experience in prior recessions.

With all due respect to Rogoff and Reinhart, this time is different for the U.S., at least in terms of our modern experience. Fed policies employed in previous recessions which were then thought to work, have failed in our current cycle. Those policies were mainly forms of lowering the Fed Funds rate, reducing bank reserve requirements, and discount window operations. We now have ZIRP and that has done nothing to stimulate the economy as the Fed had hoped it would. 

This time we have persistent high unemployment, economic stagnation, a "liquidity trap", high civilian and government debt, low savings, flat to declining wages, and substantial asset devaluation. This has been going on since 2008, a full four years. If it all sounds familiar, these same things happened in the 1930s

This time is far worse than any other modern recession. What we are seeing now is a depression, despite what the NBER would have you believe. If you are still looking for the "Big One" to happen, you are too late. It happened here and it is still happening here and in Europe. They, like us, have tried to paper over most of the effects of the boom-bust business cycle malinvestment, and they have failed and the piper is at their door.

Within that context, let me sum up my thinking:

1. The economic "good news" is largely based on fiat money steroids and will not last without continuous injections of new fiat money into the economy.

2. The last injection of fiat money (QE2) is already wearing out and money supply is most likely declining.

3. A declining MS will result in further economic weakness (stagnation) and flattening-to-increasing unemployment.

4. This is likely to occur in Q2-Q3 2012.

5. As soon as unemployment goes up again, the Fed will announce QE3.

6. The dollar will continue to be weak.

7. It is likely that price inflation will continue to be "modest" (as the Fed sees it) in light of ongoing real estate related asset devaluation. This depends on the amount of QE.

 

Thanks to DoctoRx and Michael Pollaro for their help with this article. 

Updating Smithers: Continued Caution for Stock Bulls


This article originally appeared in the Daily Capitalist and was written by DoctoRx, a cardiologist, medical entrepreneur, and a very successful investor with a 30 year track record.

I have frequently referred to a chart produced by a British analyst, Andrew Smithers (then click on "q and FAQs",) who brilliantly (fortuitously) published a book in March 2000 proclaiming stocks to be in the greatest bubble in history- the very month that the NASDAQ peaked over 5100.  Every three months, he updates graphically and descriptively two of the parameters he and his associates have computed that historically have had a very strong track record in predicting the course of stock prices over an appropriate period of time.  These parameters are the cyclically-averaged price-earnings (CAPE) ratio for the past 10 years and a version of Tobin's q - a ratio which measures replacement value of corporate assets, and which he argues more than adequately account for intangible but "real" assets such as intellectual property.  Here is his updated chart, using data as of 9/30/2011:

Here is his description, with an update to account for stock prices just a bit lower than year-end prices:

With the publication of the Flow of Funds data up to 30th September, 2011 (on 8th December, 2011) we have updated our calculations for q and CAPE. There has been a 1.6% rise in net worth over the quarter, due to a rise of 10.7% in the current value of real estate. This was despite a downward revision to net worth in Q2 2011 of 1.4%, mainly due to an upward revision of 2.8% in debt.

 

Both q and CAPE include data for the year ending 30th September, 2011. (99% of EPS for the S&P 500 being available by 8th December, 2011). At that date the S&P 500 was at 1131.42 and US non-financials were overvalued by 26.5% according to q and quoted shares, including financials, were overvalued by 37.5% according to CAPE. (It should be noted that we use geometric rather than arithmetic means in our calculations.)

 

As at 8th December, 2011 with the S&P 500 at 1234.35 the overvaluation by the relevant measures was 38% for non-financials and 50% for quoted shares.

Although the overvaluation of the stock market is well short of the extremes reached at the year ends of 1929 and 1999, it has reached the other previous peaks of 1906, 1936 and 1968.

CAPE measures earnings and q estimates the real value of capital employed (assets) in a business; these are complementary measures.  Interestingly, they track each other fairly closely.  Eyeballing it and trying to mentally average the two lines over the entire time period, I conclude that stocks have cycled between 0.6 and -0.6 for the past 111 years.  There are two equal and opposite extreme periods outside of those levels.  One was the World War I years extending into the early 1920s, when stock prices were extremely depressed by the combination of first near-hyperinflation during the war and then by severe price deflation (the gold standard at work correcting much of the price inflation), and then the late 1990s into the early 21st century, when the opposite occurred:  steady economic growth with declining price inflation (as Asia imploded in the late 1990s, the U.S. was able to import "deflation").  Note that the so-called Great Crash never got as depressed by these measures as in the 1920-21 depression and in the run-up to it.

My guess for a variety of reasons is that one of these days, we will look at this chart and find both CAPE and q well below the zero line.  Given that the SPY fund that mimics the S&P 500 index currently yields 1.96%, and given that even with asset growth to gradually prop up q, and also given decent increases in CAPE as 2002-4 earnings get replaced with presumably higher earnings (if for no other reason than inflation and population growth), there is a substantial chance that at some point in the next five years, a large drop in the stock indices is likely to occur that will be greater than dividends received.  Thus stocks remain risky relative to cash-like, near-zero-yielding instruments, 2012 significant cyclical economic downturn or not.

While it is impossible to define how important taxable money is to marginal prices in the stock market vs. demand coming from tax-deferred accounts such as pension funds, IRAs, etc., please recall that the Obamacare law provided for large tax increases on investment income for higher-income investors, beginning in January 2013. At the same time, the Bush (1)-era law limiting capital losses to a very low amount means that investors have a double risk that will intensify in one year unless that provision of the law is changed.

Their capital gains and dividends get taxed, but capital losses above modest amounts are not equivalently deductible.

I would suggest that too many investors have downplayed the Japanese example of the coexistence of falling stock markets and ZIRP and have piled or stayed into stocks out of frustration with the alternatives.  Yet the Japanese situation of an excess of savings chasing insufficient (perceived) investment opportunities is happening here, as I described last summer in Yotai Gap to Provide Fuel to the Treasury Bond Bull?.

Only time will tell, but an investment pendulum with an exceedingly long cycle length may have definitively swung in the other direction.  In the 1958-60 period, stocks played seesaw with Treasury bond yields, for the first time dropping below the bond yields.  Many seers called the end of the stock bull market for that reason; but it turned out to be the end of the bond bull market instead, which had been propped up in price (down in yield) for a quarter of a century for all sorts of reasons. 

This disconnect peaked in 2000, when Treasury yields across all parts of the yield curve peaked around 6.5% at a time when the SPY was yielding much less than 2%.  This correlates precisely with the peak in the above chart in 2000.  Remember "Dow 36,000"?  What we got was much, much more like Dow 3600. 

While I think that Dow 3600 is now a remote possibility, I think that a four digit Dow is a reasonable possibility if indeed a new recession (or, intensification of the 2007 "Great Recession" aka a mild depression) in fact supervenes in the U.S. this year or soon enough that asset values and CAPE are not inflated too high over time.  Meaning, a 20%+ drop from these levels will far outweigh the dividend return in the same time frame.

After half a century of investors accepting the "New Normal" paradigm that stocks should pay out less in dividend yield than a long-term Treasury bond, that ratio finally flipped to the historical level of stocks yielding more than bonds briefly about three years ago, following the plunge in Treasury yields in late fall into December 2008.  Then stocks soared as did Treasury yields.  But here we are with the SPY yielding 2% and the 10-year Treasury yielding less than that.  And the Dow DIAmonds yield 2.6%, just a bit under the 30-year T-bond.

Demographics have begun to work against stocks.  A disproportionate and increasing amount of financial wealth is held by retirees and near-retirees.  Writing as someone who was strongly stock-oriented for most of a long investing career, I can assert that at today's low dividend yields, it is difficult to see stocks as strong trees on which to rely.  Rather, I continue to favor a mix of tax-free bonds for taxable income, and cash and commodity inflation hedges for tax-deferred retirement accounts.

Is there a role for stocks in a diversified investment portfolio?  Yes, of course, especially for savvy pros.  But I think that my views on reversion to the mean using the Smithers parameters provide cautionary evidence for the bulls who point to current "low" price-earnings ratios and "sunny skies almost forever" views of corporate profits and predict stock market returns well above bond yields for years to come.

The Sound Money Institute is and educational organization dedicated to the stability and soundness of the United States Dollar. Faced with unprecedented pressure to spend beyond its means the United States Government has pressured the Federal Reserve Bank to monetize the debt or in other words they are printing currency to fund deficit spending by the US Treasury.

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